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Shifting Contours of Directors’ Fiduciary 
Duties and Norms in Comparative 
Corporate Governance 
Jennifer G. Hill* 
 
Corporate law and corporate governance are often called upon to address problems in 
international and transnational contexts. Financial markets are global and the problems in those 
markets are often similar, if not identical, even though the capital market structure across 
jurisdictions differs significantly. The beginning of the twenty-first century was marked by a spate 
of international corporate scandals, and the 2007–2009 global financial crisis reflected the global 
interconnectedness of contemporary international capital markets. 
These events highlighted the issue of accountability for wrongful conduct by company directors 
and officers. Modern corporate governance is highly fragmented, encompassing an array of techniques 
to control the improper exercise of discretion and conflicts of interest. According to Professor Gilson, 
it is “a braided framework” that encompasses, not only autonomous legal rules, but also non-
binding norms. 
This Article analyzes, from a comparative perspective, two core aspects of this “braided 
framework.” First, the Article considers fiduciary duties. It argues that, although there are broad 
similarities in the scope and operation of fiduciary duties in common law jurisdictions, such as the 
United States, United Kingdom and Australia, at a more granular level, there are important 
differences, which may affect the accountability of directors and officers. 
Secondly, the Article examines corporate codes. Although generally non-binding, corporate 
codes can create powerful norms concerning the role of directors and officers and the exercise of their 
powers. These codes may also interact with fiduciary duties in complex and interesting ways, either 
complementing, or creating tensions with, those duties. Yet, such codes are by no means 
homogeneous, and substantive differences can often be traced to the identity of the actors responsible 
for writing them. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate law and corporate governance are often called upon to address 
problems in international and transnational contexts. Financial markets are global 
and the problems in those markets are often similar, if not identical, even though 
the capital market structure across jurisdictions differs significantly. The beginning 
of the twenty-first century was marked by a spate of international corporate 
scandals,1 including Enron and WorldCom in the United States.2 These scandals 
were similar but isolated events. The same cannot be said of the 2007–2009 global 
financial crisis, which exemplified the global “interconnectedness” of contemporary 
international capital markets.3 
These corporate crises prompted significant financial market reforms.4 
Discerning the causes of these crises was no easy feat, yet the framing of the 
underlying problems was critical to the regulatory responses. For example, the 
collapse of Enron had multiple possible explanations, from board failure, to 
conflicts of interest of auditors and other reputational intermediaries, to defective 
remuneration structures.5 In relation to the global financial crisis, opinion was 
divided as to whether shareholders were part of the problem, or a potential solution, 
to excessive risk-taking in corporate law.6 
These crises highlighted the issue of accountability for improper conduct by 
company directors and officers. Modern corporate regulation today “occurs in 
many rooms.”7 It is highly fragmented, encompassing an array of techniques to 
 
* Bob Baxt AO Chair in Corporate and Commercial Law, Monash University Faculty of Law, 
Melbourne, Australia; Research Member, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). I would 
like to thank participants at the Transnational Fiduciary Law Conference, convened by UCI Law and 
Bucerius Law School in 2019, and Mitheran Selvendran for research and editing assistance. 
1. These scandals included, for example, Royal Ahold in the Netherlands, Parmalat in Italy, 
Elan in Ireland, Kirch in Germany, and One.Tel and HIH in Australia. See, e.g., Guido Ferrarini & Paolo 
Giudici, Financial Scandals and the Role of Private Enforcement: The Parmalat Case, in AFTER ENRON: 
IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNISING SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE 
US 159 (John Armour & Joseph A McCahery eds., 2006); Jennifer G. Hill, Regulatory Responses 
to Global Corporate Scandals, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 367 (2005). 
2.   See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern 
Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., What 
Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2004); see also 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Catastrophic Financial Failures: Enron and More, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 423 (2004). 
3.   See Tony D’Aloisio, Chairman, Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm’n, Presentation at the Asia 
Securities Forum in Sydney: Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, 13 (Oct. 12, 2009). 
4.   Luca Enriques, Regulators’ Response to the Current Crisis and the Upcoming Reregulation of Financial 
Markets: One Reluctant Regulator’s View, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1147 (2009). Professor Enriques describes 
the response to the global financial crisis in these terms, however, the same can also be said for the 
earlier set of scandals, including Enron. See Hill, supra note 1. 
5.   See generally Coffee, supra note 2. See also Gordon, supra note 2. 
6.   See, e.g., Jennifer G. Hill, Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International Stewardship Codes, 
41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 497 (2018). 
7.   Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL 
PLURALISM 1 (1981). 
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control improper exercise of discretion and conflicts of interest, to ensure 
accountability. According to Professor Gilson, corporate governance is “a braided 
framework encompassing legal and non-legal elements”8 – not only autonomous 
legal rules, but also non-binding principles, processes, and institutions.9 
This Article discusses two core aspects of this “braided framework”, which 
provide constraints on how directors and officers exercise their powers and 
discretion. The first of these is the law relating to directors’ fiduciary duties, which 
occupies a central role in common law jurisdictions. This Article examines the 
fiduciary duties of directors and officers from a comparative law perspective in three 
common law jurisdictions: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. It 
shows that although, at a general level, there are broad similarities across these 
countries, at a more granular level, there are important differences which may affect 
the accountability of directors and officers. 
Fiduciary duties were once the primary constraint on the powers and 
discretion of company directors and officers. Today, however, they are only part of 
that “braided framework”10—one of a number of relevant sources of regulation.11 
Corporate codes have become a particularly important aspect of contemporary 
corporate governance. These codes, although generally non-binding, create 
powerful norms concerning the role of directors and officers and expectations 
regarding their use of power. Fiduciary duties and corporate codes operate 
holistically and interact in complex and interesting ways. Corporate codes, for 
example, provide a matrix in which fiduciary duties operate, and can complement, 
or create tensions with, those duties. Yet, as this Article shows, corporate codes are 
by no means homogeneous, and substantive differences can often be traced to the 
identities of the actors behind the relevant codes. 
This Article is structured as follows. Part two provides a snapshot of the 
historical basis for classifying company directors and officers as fiduciaries and the 
transmission of broadly similar fiduciary law principles applying to company 
directors and officers across common law jurisdictions. Part three discusses the 
influential law matters hypothesis, and critiques its assumption that there are major 
differences between common law and civil law approaches to corporate regulation, 
but a unified Anglo-American common law. As part three demonstrates, there are 
many significant differences relating to fiduciary duties in the corporate law context 
in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Part four shifts focus to 
examine soft law, specifically the rise of corporate codes and their function as “norm 
creators.” It considers the complex ways in which these codes can interact with 
directors’ and officers’ duties. Part five concludes, noting that there can be tensions 
between the law of fiduciary duties and corporate codes in, for example, the area of 
 
8.   Ronald J. Gilson, From Corporate Law to Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 3, 6 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018). 
9.     Id. 
10.   Id. 
11.   John Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE 
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 29 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 3d ed.2017). 
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shareholder versus stakeholder interests and rights. The Article concludes by 
suggesting that corporate governance codes are likely to increase, rather than 
decrease, jurisdictional differences relating to the duties of directors and officers. 
II. THE COMMON HERITAGE OF COMMON LAW DIRECTORS’ DUTIES IN 
CORPORATE LAW 
The law relating to fiduciary duties of company directors was historically a 
national affair.12 The classification of company directors as “fiduciaries” was a 
central pillar of early British law, developing, by analogy, to agents13 and trustees14 
who were considered archetypical fiduciaries.15 The famous 1742 U.K. decision in 
Charitable Corp. v. Sutton,16 laid the groundwork for modern directors’ duties. In that 
case, Lord Hardwicke L.C. stated that “by accepting a trust of this sort, a person is 
obliged to execute it with fidelity and reasonable diligence.”17 Throughout the 
nineteenth century, British company law was notoriously laissez-faire18 and fiduciary 
duties served as the primary constraint on directors’ discretion and conduct.19 
Numerous rationales and justifications have been given for the imposition of 
fiduciary duties on particular social actors. Some scholars have stressed the role of 
trust, dependence, and vulnerability of the beneficiary in the relationship.20 From a 
historical perspective, the imposition of fiduciary duties on company directors and 
officers was justifiable under this rationale. At the time of Berle and Means’ seminal 
1932 text, The Modern Corporation and Private Property,21 for example, shareholders 
were viewed as a dispersed and vulnerable group, in need of legal protection due to 
 
12.   See Jennifer G. Hill & Matthew Conaglen, Directors’ Duties and Legal Safe Harbours: A 
Comparative Analysis, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 305 (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew 
S. Gold eds., 2018). 
13.   See Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Principles in Agency Law, in FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES IN 
AGENCY LAW (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2018) (stating that, under the common law, “agency 
relationships are categorically treated as fiduciary” and noting that the fiduciary character of the agency 
relationship is directly linked to the potentially “grave impact” for the principal of the agent’s 
actions). 
14.   Matthew Conaglen, Interaction Between Statutory and General Law Duties Concerning Company 
Director Conflicts, 31 CO. & SEC. L.J. 403, 404–05 (2013). 
15.   Hosp Products Ltd v US Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41, 68 (Austl.). 
16.   Charitable Corp. v. Sutton (1742) 2 Atk. 400. 
17.   Id. at 406; see also Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the 
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1096–97 (1968); ASIC v. Cassimatis 
[No. 8] (2016) FCR 1023, [417] ff (Austl.). According to Sutton’s case, the touchstone for assessing 
whether directors had acted with reasonable diligence was the standard of “gross neglect.” See supra text 
accompanying note 16. 
18.   See Brian R. Cheffins, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH BUSINESS 
TRANSFORMED, 35, 194, 273 (2008); L. C. B. Gower, The English Private Company, 18 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 535, 536–37 (1953). 
19.   See generally Jennifer G. Hill, The Trajectory of American Corporate Governance: Shareholder 
Empowerment and Private Ordering Combat, U. ILL. L. REV. 507, 553–56 (2019). 
20.   See, e.g., Leonard I. Rotman, Fiduciary Law’s “Holy Grail”: Reconciling Theory and Practice in 
Fiduciary Jurisprudence, 91 B.U. L. REV. 921, 933 (2011). 
21.   ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932). 
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their inability to act collectively.22 Today, however, the dominant shareholders in 
some jurisdictions, including the United States and United Kingdom, are powerful 
institutional investors.23 Although these shareholders are hardly vulnerable, the 
imposition of fiduciary duties on directors and officers can still be justified on other 
rationales, such as the breadth of their discretionary powers24 and their control of 
“critical resources belonging to the beneficiary.”25 
There are strong similarities in the approach to modern fiduciary duties of 
company directors and officers across common law jurisdictions, such as the United 
Kingdom, the United States and Australia. Each has equitable and common law 
(“general law”) duties applying to directors, that are designed to address Adam 
Smith’s classic problems of “negligence and profusion”,26 or, in modern economic 
parlance, “agency costs.”27 
These broad jurisdictional similarities regarding the duties of company 
directors and officers are hardly surprising. They are clear historical examples of 
legal transplantation28 whereby the U.K. model of directors’ duties was transmitted 
to common law countries around the world.29 In the United States, for instance, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery acknowledged directors as fiduciaries in the 1926 
decision in Bodell v. General Gas and Electric Corp.,30 providing the basis for Delaware 
law’s equitable duties of loyalty and care.31 Australia also took its lead from the 
 
22.   Although Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928), concerned a two-man joint 
venture, its language encapsulates a “shareholder vulnerability” rationale for the imposition of fiduciary 
duties on company directors and officers. Meinhard is, however, rarely cited in the public corporation 
context by the Delaware courts. 
23.   See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: 
Theory, Evidence and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2019). 
24.   Paul B. Miller, The Identification of Fiduciary Relationships, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
FIDUCIARY LAW 367, 379 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019). 
25.   D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399 
(2002). In the corporate law context, technically those resources “belong” to the corporation, which is 
also the beneficiary of fiduciary duties. 
26.   ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, 313 (1776). 
27.   See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
28.   See generally David Cabrelli & Mathias Siems, Convergence, Legal Origins, and Transplants in 
Comparative Corporate Law: A Case-Based and Quantitative Analysis, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 109 (2015). For 
discussion of some of the difficulties in transplanting law, see, e.g., Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and 
Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974); Amir N. Licht, Legal Plug-ins: Cultural Distance, 
Cross-Listing, and Corporate Governance Reform, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 195 (2004); Gunther Teubner, 
Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 
11 (1998). 
29.   See Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
285, 286 (2008) (arguing that historically legal traditions were spread around the globe primarily by 
conquest and colonization. Transmission of British common law principles exemplifies the latter 
method of transmission). 
30.   Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Co., 132 A. 442 (Del. Ch. 1926), aff’d, 140 A.2d 264 (Del. 1927). 
See generally Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty, 11 U. PA. J. 675, 
680–81 (2009). 
31.   Under modern Delaware law, there was some uncertainty as to whether there existed a 
third duty, namely the duty of good faith. It is now accepted, however, that the so-called “duty of good 
faith” is not a stand-alone duty, but is rather a component of the broader duty of loyalty. See generally 
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United Kingdom with regard to corporate law, including directors’ duties. The 1925 
U.K. decision, Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co.,32 for example, represented the 
leading decision in Australia in the area of directors’ duty of care for over 70 years. 
Directors’ “no conflict” and “no profit” duties in Australia were also firmly based 
on U.K. case law.33 
III. THE LAW MATTERS HYPOTHESIS AND UNCOMMON COMMON LAW 
APPROACHES TO DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
The broad jurisdictional similarities between the United Kingdom, United 
States, and Australia accord with the influential law matters hypothesis, promulgated 
by La Porta et al. approximately 20 years ago.34 This hypothesis claimed that the 
structure of capital markets around the world is directly linked to a country’s 
corporate governance regime. According to the hypothesis, “legal investor 
protection is a strong predictor of financial development,”35 and it forecast that 
jurisdictions with a high level of minority shareholder protection would develop 
deeply dispersed ownership structures.36 “Legal origins” played a central role 
because the study concluded that common law jurisdictions, within the British “legal 
family,”37 provided stronger minority shareholder protection than civil law 
jurisdictions.38 One feature of the common law that the study viewed as particularly 
advantageous—and which is central to the development of the law of fiduciary 
duties—was the important role of independent judges, who relied on legal reasoning 
to decide cases.39 
The law matters hypothesis provided support for convergence theory40 via a 
process of horizontal imitation. One of the implications of the hypothesis was that 
 
Holland, supra note 30, at 679. For a detailed analysis of the historical development of directors’ 
fiduciary duties in the United States, see Marcia M. McMurray, Special Project, An Historical Perspective 
on the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 605 (1987). 
32.   Re City Equitable Fire Ins. Co. [1925] Ch 407. See generally Rosemary Teele Langford et al., 
The Origins of Company Directors’ Statutory Duty of Care, 37 SYDNEY L. REV. 489, 507–08 (2015). 
33.   Pivotal U.K. cases in this area included, for example, Aberdeen Ry. Co. v. Blaikie Bros. 
(1854) UKHL 1 Paterson 394; Transvaal Lands Co. v. New Belgium (Transvaal) Land and Dev. Co. 
[1914] Ch 488; Cook v. Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554; Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134; 
Indus. Dev. Consultant Ltd. v. Cooley [1972] 1 WLR 443. 
34.   See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta 
et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999). 
35.   La Porta et al., supra note 29. 
36.   See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], CORP. GOVERNANCE 
FACTBOOK 17 (2019) (classifying only four countries, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Australia and Canada, as having a dispersed ownership structure for listed companies). 
37.   Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1119 (1998) (submitting 18 
common law jurisdictions in their original sample, including United States, Canada, Australia, India). 
38.   See David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1544–45 (2004). 
39.   See generally Cabrelli & Siems, supra note 28, at 118–20. 
40.   For an overview of the convergence theory and the convergence-divergence debate, see 
generally CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & 
Mark J. Roe eds., 2004); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Law and Governance, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 28 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-
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jurisdictions with substandard legal rules would follow the siren song of economic 
efficiency by voluntarily adopting superior rules.41 The study proved to be 
extraordinarily influential in defining a set of problems and solutions42 and had real 
world consequences. On the premise that good corporate governance can improve 
national economic performance, major international organizations, such as the 
OECD, developed model corporate governance codes for ready international 
transplantation.43 The World Bank also adopted the methodology of the law matters 
study, applying it to a number of working papers, including the bank’s Doing Business 
reports.44 
In spite of its influence, the law matters hypothesis attracted widespread 
academic criticism,45 including criticism of its methodology.46 Commentators also 
disputed the study’s stark divide between common law and civil law legal systems,47 
and between supposedly flexible judge-made law under a common law system and 
rigid codification in civil law jurisdictions.48 Consistent with these critiques, the idea 
that directors’ fiduciary duties constitute a unique feature of the common law may 
 
Georg Ringe eds., 2018); Jennifer G. Hill, The Persistent Debate About Convergence in Comparative Corporate 
Governance, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 743 (2005). 
41.   See Hill, supra note 40, at 744. 
42.   See e.g., Stijn Claessens & Burcin Yurtoglu, Corporate Governance and Development—An Update, 
10 GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FORUM FOCUS, 1, 11 (2012); Steve Kaplan & Luigi Zingales, 
How ‘Law and Finance’ Transformed Scholarship, Debate, CHI. BOOTH REV. (Mar. 5, 2014), 
https://review.chicagobooth.edu/magazine/spring-2014/how-law-and-finance-transformed-scho 
larship -debate. 
43.   See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], G20/ OECD PRINCIPLES 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 (2015) (stating that the principles “help policy makers evaluate and 
improve the legal, regulatory, and institutional framework for corporate governance, with a view to 
supporting economic efficiency, sustainable growth and financial stability”). But cf. Licht, supra note 28, 
at 196 (arguing that in the “long and checkered” history of legal transplantation, “direct transplantation 
efforts were largely futile in generating Western-like economic growth”). 
44.   See Cabrelli & Siems, supra note 28, at 120. The World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) were already interested in the connection between corporate governance and economic 
outcomes. During the 1997 East Asian Financial Crisis, the World Bank and the IMF included 
corporate governance reform as a condition to financial assistance. See Gilson, supra note 8, at 5; 
Timothy Lane et al., IMF-Supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, 178 Int’l Monetary Fund 
Occasional Paper 1, 72–73 (1999); John M. Broder, Asia Pacific Talks Vow Tough Ac tion on Economic 
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 1997), available at https://www.nytimes.com/19 97/11/26/world/asia-
pacific-talks-vow-tough-action-on-economic-crisis.html. 
45.   See Claessens & Yurtoglu, supra note 42, at 12. 
46.   See, e.g., Holger Spamann, The “AntiDirector Rights Index” Revisited, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. (ISSUE 
2) 467 (2010). La Porta et al. responded to methodological criticism of their original study in several 
later papers. See Cabrelli & Siems, supra note 28, at 123. 
47.   See Skeel, supra note 38, at 1546; Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A 
Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 791, 799 n.27 (2002). 
48.   See Cabrelli & Siems, supra note 28, at 117–18 (arguing that common law and civil law are 
regarded as diverging with respect to “their relevant sources of law and legal methods” and stating that 
whereas common law judges are considered to solve individual disputes by deductive reasoning, civil 
law judges are regarded as “law-appliers”, who are expected to follow codified rules); see, e.g., Cally 
Jordan, The Conundrum of Corporate Governance, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 983, 1005, nn.66–68 (2005) (arguing 
that the distinction between common law and civil law under the law matters hypothesis is over-
generalized, and that the jurisdictional line between these two forms of regulation is far more blurred 
in practice). 
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be misleading, given that functional equivalents to fiduciary duties exist in civil law 
jurisdictions.49 
In addition to exaggerating the differences between common law and civil law 
legal families, the law matters hypothesis also arguably overstated the similarities 
within the common law world itself.50 Although it is often assumed that there is a 
unified Anglo-American approach (and a unified Anglo-Australian approach), 
significant differences appear across these jurisdictions when one shifts from a 
general, to a more granular, level.51 
First, U.S. and U.K. corporate law had different organizational starting points, 
which led to different corporate law trajectories, including in the area of directors’ 
duties.52 Whereas the organizational origins of U.S. corporate law were British royal 
chartered corporations, which had strong quasi-public roots,53 British company law 
derived from unincorporated joint stock (or “deed of settlement”) companies, 
which were quintessentially private bodies.54 These different organizational origins 
affected the scope of directors’ discretion and the role of fiduciary duties.55 
Second, whereas under Delaware law, all duties owed by directors, including 
the duty of care, tend to be classified as “fiduciary”,56 U.K. and Australian judicial 
decisions have adopted a narrower view of fiduciary duties,57 emphasizing that only 
proscriptive duties (or duties requiring “self-denial”)58 are fiduciary in nature.59 On 
 
49.   See, e.g., Martin Gelter & Geneviève Helleringer, Fiduciary Principles in European Civil Law 
Jurisdictions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 583 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019). 
In the Asian civil law context, see Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of 
Corporate Law and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189 (2000). 
50.   See, e.g., Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: A Comparative 
Analysis of the UK and US, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE INT’L (NUMBER 3) 147, 147–48 (2006); Steven 
Toms & Mike Wright, Divergence and Convergence within Anglo-American Corporate Governance Systems: Evidence 
from the US and UK, 1950–2000, 47 BUS. HIST. (NUMBER 2) 267, 267–68 (2005). 
51.   Jennifer G. Hill, Subverting Shareholder Rights: Lessons from News Corp.’s Migration to Delaware, 
63 VAND. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2010). 
52.   See generally Hill, supra note 19, at 541–47. 
53.   See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 159 (2019); Hill, supra note 
19, at 541–44; L.C.B. Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69 HARV. L. 
REV. (NUMBER 8) 1369, 1370–72 (1956). As a result, most early U.S. chartered businesses were regarded 
as “public agencies.” See Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800: Part I, 2 
HARV. L. REV. 105, 110–11 (1888); Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business 
Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 22 (1945). In Britain, royal chartered companies reflected the theory 
that the corporate form was a body, approved by the state to act in “the national interest.” See C.A. 
COOKE, CORPORATION, TRUST AND COMPANY: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL HISTORY 78 (1950). 
54.   Unincorporated deed of settlement companies were effectively large partnerships with 
strong contractual elements, which also made creative use of trust law to artificially replicate the benefits 
of incorporation. See John Morley, The Common Law Corporation: The Power of the Trust in Anglo-American 
Business History, 116 COLUM. 2145, 2157–66 (2016). See generally Hill, supra note 19, at 544–47. 
55.   See generally Hill, supra note 19, at 541. 
56.   See MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE 
PERFORMANCE OF NON-FIDUCIARY DUTIES 13 (2010). 
57.   See Conaglen, supra note 14, at 405. 
58.   Gelter & Helleringer, supra note 49. 
59.  See also Honourable T.F. Bathurst, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 
Director’s, Trustee and Fiduciary Duties in the Context of Domestic Corporate Arrangements, Address 
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this more restrictive interpretation, only the “no conflict” and “no profit” duties 
qualify as fiduciary. Other duties, including the duty of care60 and the duty to act in 
good faith in the best interests of the company, are non-fiduciary in nature.61 This 
difference in classification can affect the remedies available for breach of duty. 
Third, in relation to the duty of loyalty, there is no equivalent under U.K. or 
Australian case law to the U.S. concept of “entire fairness.”62 U.K. and Australian 
courts are simply not permitted to evaluate directors’ conduct from the perspective 
of fairness.63 Also, whereas independent directors in the United States, have played 
a significant role as a sanitizing device for approving conflicts of interest,64 U.K. 
and Australian company law primarily reserved this role for shareholders.65 
Fourth, the sources of directors’ duty vary in contemporary corporate law 
across common law jurisdictions. In Delaware, directors’ fiduciary duties, in 
accordance with their ancestry, are purely equitable.66 Modern U.K. and Australian 
law, on the other hand, encompass statutory directors’ duties, which interact 
differently with general law fiduciary duties.67 Under the U.K. model, directors’ 
statutory duties, which were introduced in 2006,68 eradicate and replace the general 
law principles,69 but are not necessarily co-extensive with those general law 
principles. Section 172(1) of 2006 U.K. Companies Act,70 for example, creates a 
statutory directors’ duty that appears to lack any prior general law counterpart. The 
provision requires directors to act in the way that they consider, in good faith, is 
“most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members 
 
at the Annual Family Law Conference Hobart, Tasmania (Oct. 13, 2012) (citing Breen v Williams (1996) 
186 CLR 71, 93, 137 (Austl.); Pilmer v Duke Grp Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 165, 270–71 (Austl.)). 
60.   Cf. J.D. Heydon, Are the Duties of Company Directors to Exercise Care and Skill Fiduciary?, in 
EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW 185 (Simone Degeling & James Edelman eds., 2005); William M. Heath, 
The Director’s “Fiduciary” Duty of Care and Skill: A Misnomer, 25 CO. & SEC. L.J. 370 (2007). 
61.   See, e.g., Aequitas Ltd v AEFC Leasing Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 14, 284 (Austl.). 
62.   See generally Deborah A. DeMott, The Figure in the Landscape: A Comparative Sketch of Directors’ 
Self-Interested Transactions, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243 (1999). Cf., however, Andrew F. Tuch, 
Reassessing Self-Dealing: Between No Conflict and Fairness, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 939 (2019) (arguing that the 
divide between the U.K. and the U.S. approaches to the duty of loyalty in relation to self- dealing is less 
sharp in practice than often assumed). 
63.   Aberdeen Ry. Co. v Blaikie Bros., (1854) 1 Macq 461. 
64.   See James D. Cox, Corporate Governance in the United States: The Evolving Role of the Independent 
Board, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN ASIA-PACIFIC CRITIQUE 379, 388 (Low Chee Keong ed., 
2002) (stating that “[t]he most noticeable aspect of American corporate governance is the law’s repeated 
resort to the independent director as a cleansing agent.”). 
65.   See Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134; Furs Ltd. v Tomkies [1936] 54 CLR 583 
(Austl.); Winthrop Investments Ltd v Winns Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 666 (Austl.); see also Corporations Act 2001 
ch 2E (Austl.) (regarding authorization of related party transactions). 
66.   See generally Holland, supra note 30, at 677–78. 
67.   See generally Hill & Conaglen, supra note 12. 
68.   See Companies Act 2006, c. 46 pt. 10 ch. 2 (UK). 
69.   Yet, in an interesting example of statutory interpretation, the U.K. legislation states that the 
statutory directors’ duties should be interpreted in accordance with these now-defunct general law 
principles. See Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 170(4) (UK). 
70.   See Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 172(1) (UK). 
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as a whole.”71 Adopting an “enlightened shareholder value” approach to corporate 
governance,72 the section states that, in fulfilling this duty, directors must consider 
the interests of a non-exhaustive list of stakeholders and the impact of corporate 
actions on the community and the environment.73 Australia’s statutory directors’ 
duty scheme is quite different from the U.K. model in that its statutory duties74 are 
“additive to the general law rather than substitutionary.”75 Also, Australian 
lawmakers considered, but rejected the need to introduce any statutory duty 
involving stakeholder interests, akin to section 172(1) of the U.K. Act.76 
Fifth, the scope of the safe harbors providing protection for breach of duty 
by directors differs across these jurisdictions.77 This disparity is particularly evident 
in the context of the duty of care.78 In Delaware, directors receive a high level of 
protection against monetary liability for breach of the duty of care as a result of the 
capacious U.S. business judgment rule,79 combined with legislative approval, under 
 
71.   See id. See generally GOWER: PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 501–04 (Paul L. 
Davies & Sarah Worthington eds., 10th ed. 2016) [hereinafter GOWER]. 
72.   See GOWER, supra note 71, at 502–03; see also Andrew Keay, The Duty to Promote the Success of 
the Company: Is it Fit for Purpose in a Post-Financial Crisis World?, in DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND 
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION IN THE WAKE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 50, 60 (Joan Loughrey ed., 
2013); Andrew Keay, Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United Kingdom’s 
“Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach,” 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 577 (2007). 
73.   See generally GOWER, supra note 71. In spite of this apparently “public” focus in § 172(1), 
however, the duty remains firmly shareholder-oriented in practice, because the U.K. statutory directors’ 
duties are owed to the company, and enforceable only by the company, or its shareholders in derivative 
suit. Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 170(1) (UK); Virginia E. Harper Ho, Enlightened Shareholder Value: 
Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder- Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 79 (2010). 
74.   See Corporations Act 2001 ss 180–184 (Austl.). 
75.   See G.F.K. Santow, Codification of Directors’ Duties, 73 AUSTL. L.J. 336 (1999) (noting that, 
historically, Australia has placed more emphasis on corporate legislation than the United Kingdom). 
Australian corporate legislation explicitly preserves the operation of directors’ general law duties 
alongside the statutory duties. See Corporations Act 2001 s 185 (Austl.). Also, the duties in these parallel 
regimes are not necessarily coterminous. See Jason Harris et al., Shareholder Primacy Revisited: Does the Public 
Interest Have Any Role in Statutory Duties?, 26 CO. & SEC. L.J. 355, 361 et seq. (2008). 
76.   Two Australian government reports rejected calls to introduce a statutory provision like § 
172(1) of the U.K. Companies Act (2006), on the basis that the U.K. provision was overly prescriptive, 
unnecessary, and would result in confusion in the Australian context. See Parliament of Australia, 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (“PJC”), Corporate Responsibility: 
Managing Risk and Creating Value (2006); Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, The Social 
Responsibility of Corporations: Report (2006). 
77.   See generally Hill & Conaglen, supra note 12. 
78.   See, e.g., Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 519 (2012). 
79.   The U.S. business judgment rule assumes that the directors, in making a business decision, 
have acted “on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in 
the best interests of the company.” See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also 
Gagliardi v. Trifoods International, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052–53 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating that the U.S. 
business judgment rule will protect directors, provided they “act in good faith and meet minimal 
proceduralist standards of attention”). There has been academic debate in the United States as to 
whether the duty of care is shaped by the business judgment rule, or is doctrinally separate from, and 
merely protected by, the business judgment rule. For the latter approach, see Lyman Johnson, The Modest 
Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW 625 (2000); D. Gordon Smith, The Modern Business Judgment Rule, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 83 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff 
Solomon eds., 2016). 
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Del GCL § 102(b)(7), of charter exculpation provisions that exclude liability for 
negligence, including gross negligence.80 The breadth of this protection has attracted 
criticism in recent times.81 Indeed, even aspects of the duty of loyalty, long treated 
as the immutable core of fiduciary obligation in Delaware,82 can now be waived 
under Delaware law.83 
In the United Kingdom and Australia, the protection offered to directors for 
breach of fiduciary duty, including the duty of care, is far less generous. The United 
Kingdom has no business judgment rule84 and Australia’s statutory business 
judgment rule,85 although ostensibly modeled on the U.S. version,86 operates in an 
extremely narrow way as a result of judicial interpretation.87 Whereas U.S. statutory 
provisions, such as § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware code, expressly authorize companies 
to exculpate directors from liability for negligence, U.K. and Australian legislation 
expressly prohibits such exoneration.88 
 
80.   See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001). Some U.S. states, however, go 
further than Del. Code tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) regarding the scope of permissible exculpation. For example, 
Del. Code tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) only authorizes exoneration of directors, while other states, such as Nevada, 
Louisiana and New Jersey, also authorize protection of company officers. See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 
78.037(2) (2013); LA Stat. Ann. § 12:24(C)(4) (2011); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 14A:2–7(3) (2013). 
81.   See, e.g., John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 35, 61 (2014) (arguing that that where systemic risk exists, the U.S. business judgment rule 
can promote excessive risk-taking by directors and officers of financial institutions, justifying the 
imposition of liability rules); Holger Spamann, Monetary Liability for Breach of the Duty of Care?, 8 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 337, 339 (2016) (arguing that the complete exclusion of liability for breach of the duty of 
care in the United States is not necessarily justified by standard policy rationales and should be 
reassessed). 
82.   See Holland, supra note 30, at 687. 
83.   Del. Code tit. 8, § 122(17) was amended in 2000 to permit waiver of the corporate 
opportunity doctrine. See generally Gabriel V. Rauterberg & Eric L. Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary 
Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075 (2017). 
See also Leo E. Strine & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited Contractual Freedom, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 11, 
12 (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Loewenstein eds., 2015) (discussing the growing trend toward waiver 
of the corporate opportunity doctrine in the context of limited liability companies (LLCs) and limited 
partnerships (LPs)). 
84.   Although the concept of a business judgment rule is alien to U.K. company law, U.K. 
judges are, however, reluctant to hold directors liable for honest mistakes of judgment. See, e.g., Howard 
Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. [1974] AC 821, 835; Turquand v. Marshall, (1869) LR 4 Ch App 
376, 386; Lagunas Nitrate Co. v. Lagunas Syndicate [1899] 2 c. 392; see also M.J. Trebilcock, The Liability 
of Company Directors for Negligence, 32 MOD. L. REV. 499, 500 (1969); André Tunc, The Judge and the 
Businessman, 102 L.Q.R. 549 (1986). 
85.   Corporations Act 2001 s 180(2) (Austl.). 
86.   Australia’s statutory business judgment rule, which was introduced in 2000, is found in 
180(2) of the Corporations Act 2001. For background regarding the introduction of the statutory 
business judgment rule in Australia, see Mark Byrne, Directors to Hide from a Sea of Liabilities in a New Safe 
Harbour, 22 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 255 (2008). 
87.   In contrast to its U.S. counterpart, the courts have interpreted the Australian statutory 
business judgment rule in such a way as to place the onus of proof on the defendant directors, rather 
than on the plaintiff. See, e.g., ASIC v Rich (2009) 236 FLR 1; ASIC v Fortescue Metals Grp Ltd (2011) 190 
FCR 364; ASIC v Mariner Corp Ltd [2015] FCA 589. 
88.   See Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 232(1) (UK); Corporations Act 2001 ss 199A–199C (Austl.). 
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Finally, enforcement mechanisms for breach of directors’ duties differ across 
these three common law jurisdictions. Delaware and the United Kingdom both rely 
primarily on private enforcement of directors’ duties.89 Although a high percentage 
of civil actions filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery involve questions of 
fiduciary duty,90 only those involving breach of the duty of loyalty tend to succeed, 
given the legal safe harbors available for negligence. In the United Kingdom, on the 
other hand, very little private litigation for breach of directors’ duties is ever 
commenced due to procedural obstacles.91 
Australia diverges radically from both Delaware and the United Kingdom in 
the area of enforcement of directors’ duties because it adopts a primarily public 
enforcement model for breach of the statutory duties of directors and officers.92 
This regime enables the business regulator, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC), to bring legal actions for contravention of the 
statutory duties. It appears that this mode of enforcement has affected the substance 
of directors’ duties in Australia, shifting them away from the private to the public 
realm.93 ASIC and the courts have, for example, stated that these statutory duties 
are closely interlinked with the “public interest”94 and that breach of the duties 
constitutes, not only a private, but also a public wrong.95 In the wake of a recent 
high profile Banking Royal Commission96 in Australia, ASIC has indicated that it 
intends to use its enforcement powers in this area more aggressively in the future.97 
 
89.   In Delaware, for example, actions for breach of fiduciary duty can be brought by the 
company, or by shareholders in direct suits, derivative litigation or, most commonly, by means of class 
actions. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-
Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 167–69 (2004). In the U.K. context, there are, however, 
some aspects of public enforcement. See John Armour et al., Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An 
Empirical Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States, 6 J EMP. LEGAL STUD. 687, 716–17 (2009). 
90.   Thompson & Thomas, supra note 89, at 165 et seq. 
91.   A number of procedural differences make the United Kingdom a less hospitable 
jurisdiction for corporate litigation than Delaware. For example, class actions and contingency fees are 
available in Delaware, but not the United Kingdom, which moreover operates on a “loser pays” basis. 
See Armour et. al., supra note 89, at 692–93. 
92.   Although historically, Australia had a U.K.-style private enforcement model, this changed 
in 1993, when it introduced the statutory “civil penalty regime.” This is a distinctive public enforcement 
regime for certain contraventions of the Corporations Act 2001, including the statutory directors’ 
duties. For the full list of civil penalty provisions, including the statutory directors’ duties, see 
Corporations Act 2001 s 1317E (Austl.). 
93.   See Michelle Welsh, Realising the Public Potential of Corporate Law: Twenty Years of Civil Penalty 
Enforcement in Australia, 42 FED. L. REV. 217, 223–28 (2014); Harris et al., supra note 75. 
94.   See AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, ASIC’S APPROACH TO 
ENFORCEMENT, Information Sheet 151 (Sept. 2013), 6. 
95.   See, e.g., ASIC v Cassimatis [No. 8] (2016) FCA 1023, [455], [461], [496] ff, [503] (Aug. 26, 
2016). 
96.   COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA ROYAL COMMISSION INTO MISCONDUCT IN THE 
BANKING, SUPERANNUATION AND FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY, Final Report, Vol. 1 (2019). 
97.   In the Financial Services Royal Commission’s Final Report, Commissioner Hayne stated 
that the regulator’s first question, upon becoming aware of any entity’s breach of the law, should be 
“Why not litigate?” Id. at 427. It is anticipated that this will result in a far greater volume of litigation, 
including for breach of statutory directors’ duties, in the future. See, e.g., Michael Pelly, ASIC Set for 
Hayne Court Blitz, AUSTL. FIN. REV. (Aug. 19, 2019); see also AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND 
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IV. CODES, NORMS AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
The behavior of corporate actors is not only shaped by enforceable laws. It is 
also shaped by social norms and governance practices, which may indeed be more 
important in this respect than formal legal rules.98 Norms can interact in complex 
ways with fiduciary law99 to drive greater convergence or divergence across 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, the lines between formal legal rules and norms can 
sometimes be blurred and hard to define,100 and there can be movement in either 
direction between so-called “hard law”, comprising enforceable legal rules, and 
“soft law”, encompassing norms.101 
Corporate governance codes have proliferated around the world in recent 
decades.102 They have focused greater attention on norms and governance practices, 
many of which intersect with the dictates of fiduciary duties. These codes operate 
in a parallel universe to corporate law. They can, nonetheless, affect the scope of 
directors’ discretion, the nature of their fiduciary obligations and enforcement 
practices. Codes epitomize the shift from corporate law to corporate governance, a 
shift from “from legal rules standing alone to legal rules interacting with non-legal 
processes and institutions.” 103 
Corporate governance codes are by no means uniform across jurisdictions 
and, in some countries, have been subject to almost continuous amendment.104 The 
 
INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, ASIC Enforcement Update: January to June 2019, Report No, 625 (Aug. 19, 
2019), 3. 
98.   Another criticism sometimes made of La Porta et al.’s law matters hypothesis is that it 
focused solely on legal rules and failed to recognise the important role played by social norms and 
governance practices. See generally John C. Coffee, Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2151, 2154 et seq. (2001). 
99.   See generally Matthew Harding, Fiduciary Law and Social Norms, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF FIDUCIARY LAW 797, 797–99 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019). 
100.   See Coffee, supra note 98. Cf. however, a recent U.K. corporate governance dispute, which 
relied on a clear distinction between legal rules and norms. In 2019, Daejan Holdings (“Daejan”) 
constituted the only listed U.K. company without any women on its board of directors. It was reported 
that, Sir Philip Hampton, leader of a government review to increase the number of women in United 
Kingdom listed company boardrooms, wrote to Daejan calling on it to alter its all-male board policy, 
in accordance with prevailing corporate governance norms. According to the report, Daejan’s response 
stated, “Whilst we appreciate the views of your review body they are not enshrined in law or any formal 
regulation and we are not obliged to comply with them.” See Helen Cahill, Inside the VERY Secret 
Boardroom that’s Firmly CLOSED to Women, DAILY MAIL (June 3, 2019), 
https://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/markets/article-7095981/Inside-secret-Daejan-Holdings -bo 
ardroom-thats-firmly-CLOSED-women.html. 
101.   E.g., although the appointment of independent directors listed public company boards 
was a prevalent practice in the United States, there was no specific rule requiring this practice prior to 
the introduction of the New York Exchange Stock Exchange corporate governance rules following the 
Enron and WorldCom scandals. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual, § 303A (2003). 
102.   See Alice Klettner, Corporate Governance Codes and Gender Diversity: Management-Based 
Regulation in Action, 39 U.N.S.W. L.J. 715 (2016) (noting that in 1999, 24 countries were reported to have 
a code of corporate governance in place, compared to 64 countries in 2008, and 93 countries in 2015). 
The full list of current international codes is available on the European Corporate Governance Institute 
(ECGI) website at https://ecgi.global/content/codes. 
103.   Gilson, supra note 8. 
104.   See, e.g., Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International 
Regulation, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 10 (2011) (criticizing the “fast-paced, code changes” in Germany). 
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provisions of these codes sometimes complement and bolster key directors’ 
duties.105 For example, corporate governance codes typically stress the need for 
independent directors106 as a means of providing procedural protection against 
managerial conflicts of interest. However, in other instances, code provisions may 
create tension with established principles of fiduciary law. Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in the context of shareholder versus stakeholder rights and interests. 
The blueprint for the international corporate governance codes is the U.K. 
Corporate Governance Code, which can be traced back to the 1992 Cadbury 
Committee.107 These codes are typically non-binding, yet they can create powerful 
norms. They emanate from a variety of sources, including government agencies, 
stock exchanges and business organizations,108 and this can itself affect the norms 
they create. The content of these codes differs considerably as does their 
enforcement and administration.109 
The corporate governance codes of the United States, the United Kingdom 
and Australia reflect interesting differences in their approach to several key issues 
related to fiduciary duties, including the thorny question, which has underpinned 
corporate law since the time of the famous Berle-Dodd debate, as to whom 
directors owe their duties.110 This debate has been described as a “clash between 
the different visions of corporatism”,111 exemplifying the tension between a public 
and private image of the corporation.112 
 
105.   See, e.g., ASX CORP. GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15 n.39 (2019), https://www.asx.com.au/documents/regulation/cgc- 
principles-and-recommendations-fourth-edn.pdf (explicitly referencing a leading Australian case on the 
duty of care, ASIC v Healey [2011] FCA 717 (June 27, 2011), in its discussion of induction of new 
directors). 
106.   See ASX CORP. GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, supra note 105, at 13–15 (Recommendations 
2.3 and 2.4). Note, however, that there are many differences in the interpretation of “independence” 
across jurisdictions. See generally INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN ASIA: A HISTORICAL, CONTEXTUAL 
AND COMPARATIVE APPROACH (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2017). 
107.   SIR ADRIAN CADBURY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1992). 
108.   Hopt, supra note 104, at 12. 
109.   Id. at 13–15. 
110.   Professors Berle and Dodd both considered that directors were “trustees”; however, they 
strongly disagreed on two other matters closely tied to directors’ duties: (i) the theoretical nature of the 
corporation and (ii) the identity of the beneficiaries of directors’ fiduciary duties. Berle adopted a private 
aggregate theory of the corporation, which supported his claim that directors held their powers in trust 
for shareholders. Dodd, on the other hand, regarded the corporation as a public institution, arguing 
that directors owed their duties to a diverse group of stakeholders, including employees, creditors, and 
consumers. See A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931) 
[hereinafter Berle, Corporate Powers]; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. 
L. REV. 1365 (1932) [hereinafter Berle, Note]. See generally Jennifer G. Hill, Then and Now: Professor Berle 
and the Unpredictable Shareholder, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1005, 1009–10 (2010). 
111.   William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf 
Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 124 (2008). 
112.   See generally William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Concept of the Business Corporation, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 261 (1992). The Berle-Dodd debate laid the groundwork for the persistent debate 
concerning shareholder primacy versus stakeholder theory. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects 
of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003 (2013). 
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This public-private tension continues in corporate law and corporate 
governance today. Under traditional Anglo-Australian case law, directors have owed 
their duties to “the company as a whole,” which has generally been interpreted to 
mean the shareholders as a general body, rather than the corporation as a 
commercial entity.113 
Corporate governance codes, on the other hand, often display greater variation 
and emphasis concerning their “visions of corporatism.”114 There are several 
different categories of code, which can affect content. Codes are sometimes: (i) 
purely voluntary and self-regulatory; (ii) linked to public authorities; or (iii) 
promulgated by stock exchanges to provide listed companies with a blueprint for 
“good corporate governance.”115 
These diverse origins can result in major differences concerning the stringency 
and enforceability of these corporate governance codes.116 They can also affect the 
emphasis given to shareholder or stakeholder interests. Variations can often be 
traced to the identity of the actors behind the relevant code. For example, the U.S. 
Corporate Governance Principles,117 which were issued in January 2017, are an 
example of the first category of code. The U.S. Corporate Governance Principles 
are a set of six voluntary principles adopted by the Investor Stewardship Group 
(“ISG”).118 The ISG is a collective of some of the largest U.S.-based and 
international asset owners and managers. Signatories to the principles include, not 
only “the Big Three” fund managers (BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global 
Advisers),119 but also some activist hedge funds (ValueAct Capital and Trian 
Partners).120 Not surprisingly, given the origins and identity of the actors behind the 
code, the U.S. Corporate Governance Principles assert that directors are directly 
 
113.   See, e.g., Ngurli Ltd v McCann (1953) 90 CLR 425, 438 (Austl.) (citing the decision of 
Evershed M.R. in Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch 286, 291 (UK)). See generally J.D. 
Heydon, Directors’ Duties and the Company’s Interests, in EQUITY AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 120 
(P.D. Finn ed., 1987). However, the courts have at times stated that there will be exceptions to this 
basic principle. For example, in The Bell Grp Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corp [No. 9] (2008) WASC 239, 
para 4393 (Austl.), Owen J. stated: “This does not mean that the general body of shareholders is always 
and for all purposes the embodiment of ‘the company as a whole.’ It will depend on the context, 
including the type of company and the nature of the impugned activity or decision. . . In my view the 
interests of shareholders and the interests of the company may be seen as correlative not because the 
shareholders are the company but, rather, because the interests of the company and the interests of the 
shareholders intersect.” 
114.   See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 111. 
115.   See Eddy Wymeersch, Corporate Governance Codes and Their Implementation 2–3 (Fin. Law Inst., 
Working Paper 2006–10, Sept. 2006). 
116.   See Hopt, supra note 104, at 13–15. 
117.   Inv’r Stewardship Grp., Corporate Governance Principles for U.S. Listed Companies, https:// 
www.isgframework.org/corporate-governance-principles/ [hereinafter ISG corporate Governance 
Principles]. 
118.   See Inv’r Stewardship Grp., About the Investor Stewardship Group and the Framework for U.S. 
Stewardship and Governance, https://isgframework.org/. 
119.   See Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of 
Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POLITICS 298 (2017); Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 
23. 
120.   For the full list of signatories to the ISG Corporate Governance Principles and ISG Stewardship 
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accountable to shareholders.121 Furthermore, they state that shareholders should 
have participatory rights in corporate governance, and boards should be responsive 
to shareholders’ viewpoints.122 These principles reflect a strongly private, 
shareholder-focused conception of directors’ duties.123 
The origins of the U.K. and Australian corporate governance codes differ 
from the U.S. Corporate Governance Principles. The U.K. Corporate Governance 
Code falls within the second category of corporate governance code described 
above. It is administered by the U.K. Financial Reporting Council (FRC), an 
independent regulator, which, with the backing of the British government,124 seeks 
to “promote transparency and integrity in business.”125 Australia’s corporate 
governance principles represent the third category of code. They are drafted and 
promulgated by the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance 
Council, which comprises a group of industry stakeholders.126 
Recent amendments to the U.K. and Australian corporate governance codes 
represent a far more public conception of the corporation, and correspondingly, 
directors’ responsibilities than the U.S. Corporate Governance Principles.127 The 
U.K. and Australian corporate governance codes also clearly recognize that financial 
under-performance is not the only problem in modern corporate law, and that 
issues relating to organizational integrity are also critical. The 2018 U.K. Corporate 
Governance Code notes, for example, that the role of a successful company is not 
only to create value for shareholders, but also to contribute to “wider society.”128 It 
states that that directors must lead by example to establish a culture of integrity129 
that is aligned with the organization’s “purpose, values and strategy.”130 
The 2018 U.K. Corporate Governance Code also pays heightened attention 
to stakeholder interests, particularly those of employees. The code bolsters the 
statutory directors’ duty in section 172(1) of the U.K. Companies Act 2006, but also 
 
121.   See ISG Corporate Governance Principles, supra note 117 (“Principle 1: Boards are accountable 
to shareholders.”). 
122.   See id. (“Principle 2: Shareholders should be entitled to voting rights in proportion to their 
economic interest. Principle 3: Boards should be responsive to shareholders and be proactive in order 
to understand their perspectives.”); see also Inv’r Stewardship Grp., The Principles: Stewardship 
Framework for Institutional Investors, https://isgframework.org/stewardship-principles/. 
123.   See Berle, Corporate Powers, supra note 110; Berle, Note, supra note 110. 
124.   See Fin. Reporting Council, About the FRC, https://www.frc.org.uk/about-the-frc. 
125.   The FRC’s Board of Directors is appointed by the U.K. Secretary of State for Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy. Fin. Reporting Council, FRC Board, https://www.frc.org.uk/about- the-
frc/structure-of-the-frc/frc-board. 
126.   See ASX CORP. GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, supra note 105, at 1 (About the Council). 
127.   See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 111. 
128.   The UK Corporate Governance Code 4 (2018), available at https://www.frc.org.uk/ 
getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK Corporate-Governance-Code-
FINAL.pdf (Principle A). 
129.   Id. at 1, 4 (Principle B). 
130.   Id. at 4 (Principle B). The British Academy’s influential research project on the “Future of 
the Corporation” also focuses on the importance of corporate culture and “societal purpose.” See THE 
BRITISH ACADEMY, FUTURE OF THE CORPORATION: RESEARCH SUMMARIES 26–27, 32–33, 48–49 
(2018), https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Future%20of%20the%20 
Corporation%20Research%20Summaries%20-%20British%20Academy.pdf. 
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goes further than legislation in the norms it creates. First, the code states that the 
board should describe in the company’s annual report how the interests of 
stakeholders have been considered in board decision-making131 and should 
“understand the views” of non-shareholder stakeholders.132 Secondly, whereas 
section 172(1) involves protection of stakeholder interests,133 the 2018 amendments 
to the code promote use of structural features to ensure actual participation in 
corporate governance by employees.134 The U.K. code now outlines three 
alternative methods for ensuring workforce engagement in corporate governance: 
the appointment of an employee director, establishment of a formal workforce 
advisory panel, or designation of a non-executive director with responsibility for 
workforce related issues.135 
Australia’s 2019 Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 
(“ASX corporate governance code”),136 replicates this U.K. trend towards more 
emphasis on organizational integrity and corporate responsibilities to the public. A 
2018 Consultation Draft137 of proposed changes to the code included a specific 
reference to a listed entity’s “social licence to operate.”138 The Consultation Draft 
also stated that directors and managers were expected to consider the views and 
interests of, and engage with, a wide variety of stakeholders.139 These proposed 
revisions were the subject of widespread backlash in the business community. 
Critics argued that these changes would directly conflict with existing Australian law 
regarding directors’ and officers’ duties,140 emphasizing that Australia lacks any 
 
131.   The UK Corporate Governance Code (2018), supra note 128, at 1, 5. 
132.   Id. 
133.  It is also noteworthy that this protection is limited under section 172(1), in the sense that 
the directors are only required to consider the interests of stakeholders to the extent that such 
consideration is likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole. 
See GOWER, supra note 71, at 501–02. 
134.   See the UK Corporate Governance Code (2018), supra note 128, at 1, 5. 
135.   The UK Corporate Governance Code states that, “[i]f the board has not chosen one or 
more of these methods, it should explain what alternative arrangements are in place and why it considers 
that they are effective.” Id. at 5. 
136.   ASX CORP. GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, supra note 105. 
137.   ASX CORP. GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 4TH EDITION CONSULTATION DRAFT (2018), https://www.asx.com.au/ 
documents/asx-compliance/consultation-draft-cgc-4th-edition.pdf. 
138.   Id.; see also Bryan Horrigan, Does Corporate Performance Now Include a Social Licence to Operate?, 
AUSTL. INST. OF COMPANY DIRECTORS (Dec. 20, 2018), https://aicd.companydirectors.com.au/ 
advocacy/governance-leadership-centre/governance-driving-performance/does-corporate-perfor 
mance- now-include-a-social-licence-to-operate. 
139.   See ASX CORP. GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, supra note 137, at 25. 
140.   In addition to the argument that the expression “social licence to operate” was contrary 
to Australian law concerning directors’ duties, critics stated that the phrase was vague, uncertain, 
subjective, a product of political correctness, and potentially unfair to companies in certain industries, 
such as gaming, alcohol, tobacco and mining. See, e.g., Patrick Durkin, Board Outrage Over Push to Have a 
Social Licence, AUSTL. FIN. REV. (Aug. 1, 2018); AUSTL. INST. OF CO. DIRS., SUBMISSION TO THE 
REVIEW OF THE ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2018); 
Janet Albrechtsen, There’s a Corporate Rebellion Brewing Over Fanatical Social Justice Movements, THE AUSTL. 
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statutory directors’ duty relating to stakeholder interests analogous to section 172(1) 
of the U.K. Companies Act.141 
The final version of the 2019 ASX corporate governance code, which was 
released in February 2019, wound back several of the more controversial features 
of the draft code. In particular, it jettisoned the references to a listed company’s 
“social licence to operate.” Nonetheless, in launching the new code, the Chair of 
the ASX Corporate Governance Council noted that the controversial expression 
had been replaced by “essentially synonymous”142 terms, such as “reputation” and 
“standing in the community.”143 She also noted that, in the wake of the Australian 
Banking Royal Commission Final Report, the ASX Corporate Governance Council 
considered it “imperative that listed entities align their culture and values with 
community expectations to help arrest the loss of trust in business.”144 
Shareholder stewardship codes (“stewardship codes”) are another more recent 
variety of corporate governance code. Stewardship codes originated in the United 
Kingdom in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.145 They exemplify the 
important link between problem framing and regulatory outcomes.146 For example, 
a common view in the United States was that shareholders contributed to the global 
financial crisis, by placing pressure on corporate managers to engage in excessive 
risk-taking to increase profitability.147 But, the reverse view prevailed in the United 
Kingdom, where the real problem during the crisis was perceived to be the failure 
of institutional investors to provide a counterweight to managerial risk-taking, by 
 
141.   See Will Heath & Lauren Beasley, Proposed Fourth Edition of ASX Corporate Governance 
Principles, KING & WOOD MALLESONS (Jun. 6, 2018); cf. AUSTL. INST. OF CO. DIRS., FORWARD 
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142.   Elizabeth Johnstone, Chair, ASX Corp. Governance Council, Address at the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council: Launch of the 4th Edition of the Corporate Governance Principles & 
Recommendations (Feb. 27, 2019) at 4. 
143.   Id. 
144.   Id. at 5. 
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the global financial crisis. See The U.K. Stewardship Code, (2010). A revised version of the Code, which 
operates on a voluntary basis, was released in 2012. See The U.K. Stewardship Code, (2012). In January 
2019, the Financial Reporting Council published a draft of proposed revisions to the Stewardship Code, 
designed to strengthen the code. See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, PROPOSED REVISION TO THE U.K. 
STEWARDSHIP CODE (2019). In October 2019, the Financial Reporting Council published the 2020 
Stewardship Code, taking effect from January 1, 2020. See Baker McKenzie, The Stewardship Code 2020: 
Is This an Opportunity for Listed Companies to Increase Meaningful Stakeholder Engagement? (Nov. 11, 2019). 
146.   See generally Hill, supra note 6; Tim Bowley & Jennifer G. Hill, Stewardship and Collective 
Action: The Australian Experience, in GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER STEWARDSHIP: COMPLEXITIES, 
CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES (Dionysia Katelouzou & Dan W. Puchniak eds., Cambridge Univ. 
Press) (forthcoming 2020), available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/18/stewardship-and-
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147.   See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for 
Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 799 (2011). 
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participating in corporate governance.148 The U.K. Stewardship Code149 was 
designed to address this problem, on the basis that “[e]ffective stewardship benefits 
companies, investors and the economy as a whole.”150 
Since the time of the global financial crisis, more than twenty countries have 
followed the United Kingdom’s lead by adopting stewardship codes, and that 
number is growing.151 Asian jurisdictions, in particular, have been eager to embrace 
the shareholder stewardship concept.152 This is in spite of the fact that the capital 
market structure in many Asian countries is fundamentally different from U.K. 
capital market structure. Whereas in the United Kingdom the vast majority of shares 
of publicly listed companies are held by institutional investors,153 in Asia, the 
opposite is true. Asian listed companies typically have concentrated ownership 
structures, with family members or the state as controlling blockholders.154 
 
148.   According to the Walker Review, a lack of institutional investor engagement with UK 
banks was a key governance problem in relation to the global financial crisis. WALKER REVIEW, A 
REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY 
ENTITIES: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 72 (2009) (stating that “[w]ith hindsight it seems clear that the 
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vigorous scrutiny and engagement by major investors acting as owners.”). 
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Governance, Edited Transcript of Keynote Speech and Panel Discussion, at 21–24 (June 21, 2018). In December 
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AIFs, THE ECONOMIC TIMES (India) (Dec. 24, 2019). 
153.   In the United Kingdom, around 90% of shares are held by financial institutions and 
approximately half of these are non-UK-based. See, e.g., Paul L. Davies, Shareholders in the United Kingdom, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 355, 356 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas 
eds., 2015); HOUSE OF COMMONS BUSINESS, ENERGY AND INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE, 
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of Singapore, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 572 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. 
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Like corporate governance codes, stewardship codes emanate from different 
issuing bodies.155 In some jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom and Japan, 
stewardship codes are issued by regulators or quasi-regulators.156 In others, such as 
South Korea and South Africa, stewardship codes are promulgated by industry 
players.157 Finally, some countries, including Australia, Canada and the United 
States, have stewardship codes initiated by investors themselves.158 These 
differences in origin can influence the effectiveness of a particular code.159 It can 
also affect the extent to which a stewardship code tolerates or encourages 
shareholder activism, including collective activism.160 Also, the regulatory goals for 
introducing stewardship codes vary across jurisdictions. Whereas the U.K. 
stewardship code was designed to address the need for effective risk control 
following the global financial crisis, Japan’s stewardship code was designed to 
reverse declining profitability and increase investor returns by creating a “warmer 
climate” for foreign investors and shareholder activists.161 The Japanese example 
also shows how political friction can affect the content of stewardship codes. It 
appears that the Japanese code adopted a “relatively gentle stance”162 on 
shareholder engagement and activism as a way to appease critics of the more 
shareholder-oriented focus of the Japanese reforms.163 
Some scholars have viewed the idea of granting stronger rights to 
shareholders, or encouraging them to become more engaged in corporate 
governance, as akin to letting the fox guard the henhouse.164 However, Larry Fink, 
CEO of BlackRock, one of the world’s largest institutional investors, has declared 
that companies must benefit all of their stakeholders, including shareholders, 
employees, customers, and the communities in which they operate.”165 There is an 
increasing number of examples of this trend, whereby institutional investors have 
pursued broad social or stakeholder-related goals. In 2017, for instance, BlackRock, 
which is estimated to be one of the top three shareholders in every company listed 
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on the FTSE index, wrote to the chairs of over 300 U.K. companies, announcing 
that it would vote against executive pay increases, unless they were linked to strong 
and sustainable long-term corporate performance and were also matched by pay 
increases to rank-and-file employees.166 Also, a list of the top ten corporate 
governance issues in the United States, released by Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) in 2019, goes well beyond financial performance of corporations and 
includes topics such as board and C-suite diversity, climate change, executive 
misconduct, sexual harassment, and gun violence.167 Environmental and social 
issues now account for the majority of all shareholder proposals filed in the United 
States and companies are showing greater willingness to reach agreements with 
proponents of such resolutions as a result of the increasing interest in these issues 
demonstrated by the largest institutional investors.168 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is often assumed that there is a unified and cohesive approach to the law of 
fiduciary duties across common law jurisdictions. This Article examines three 
common law jurisdictions: the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, 
and shows that, in spite of their common legal heritage, there are nonetheless 
sufficiently significant differences to challenge any notion of homogeneity of 
directors’ and officers’ duties in these jurisdictions.169 
This Article also discusses a new and important transnational regulatory 
development: the rise of corporate governance codes in both common law and civil 
law jurisdictions. These codes, which are usually non-binding, represent an 
interesting overlay to the law of directors’ and officers’ duties. Although corporate 
governance codes often complement and bolster these duties, they can also create 
tensions with them. The tension between shareholder versus stakeholder rights and 
interests is a clear example of this situation. Also, the focus on corporate culture, 
purpose, values and trust in some modern corporate governance codes shows that 
there are multiple problems in corporate law. Corporate underperformance is one 
important issue, but organizational integrity is equally critical. 
While corporate governance codes could potentially increase convergence 
regarding directors’ and officers’ duties across jurisdictions, in fact, these codes are 
issued by different bodies, with different purposes and goals. They also vary in their 
content and are constantly evolving. Corporate governance codes are therefore 
likely to increase, rather than reduce, jurisdictional differences relating to directors’ 
and officers’ duties. 
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